Recently, association rules have been used to generate pro les of \normal" behavior for anomaly detection. However, the time factor (especially in terms of multiple time granularities) has not been studied extensively in generation of these pro les. In reality, user behavior during di erent time periods (in terms of time granularities) may be very di erent. For example, the \normal" number and duration of FTP connections may vary from working hour to midnight, from business day to weekend or holiday. Furthermore, these variations may depend on the day of the month or the week. This paper proposes to build pro les using temporal association rules in terms of multiple time granularities, and describes algorithms to discover these pro les. Because multiple time granularities are used for the pro le generation, the proposed method is more exible and precise than previous methods that use xed division of time periods. Finally, the paper describes an experiment and its analysis on real TCP-dump data.
Introduction
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are based on the belief that an intruder's behavior will be noticeably di erent from that of a legitimate user, and the belief that many unauthorized actions are detectable. Typically, IDSs employ anomaly and rule-based misuse models in order to detect intrusions. We address the pro ling issue using association rule discovery for the anomaly detection in this paper.
The anomaly detection hypothesizes its detection upon the pro le of users' \normal" behaviors. It analyzes the users' current sessions, compares them to the pro le that represents the users' normal behaviors, and reports \signi cant" deviations as suspicious attacks. If association rules are used to build the pro le, the procedure can be described as follows. First, the pro les of \normal" rules are obtained by mining the dataset in the past periods of time in which there are no attacks. In the detection phase, any rule discovered that also belongs to this pro le is ignored, as it is assumed to correspond to a normal behavior. In this sense, the suspicious behavior generates rules that do not belong to the pro le. Obviously, good pro les help in reducing the number of false alarms and detecting more intrusions.
A data mining framework including association rule discovery has been outlined by Lee et al. in 1, 2, 3] for constructing intrusion detection models. The central idea is to use auditing programs to extract an extensive set of features that describe each network connection or host session, and apply data mining programs to learn rules that accurately capture the behavior of intrusions and normal activities. Di erent mechanisms such as meta-learning are proposed to facilitate adaptability and extensibility of an IDS system.
Although the time factor has been considered in some of these papers (for example, three pro les for time periods: morning, afternoon and night are used in 3] for describing each user's behavior), no extensive e ort has been made on the study of time in uence on pro le building. In addition, the division of time mentioned in previous papers is xed and in term of single time granularity. However, in reality, the \normal" behaviors of users may be di erent in terms of di erent time granularities, and some \normal" behaviors can not be catpured using xed time divisions. For example, the \normal" number and duration of some FTP connections may vary from work hour to midnight, from bussiness day to weekend or holiday. Furthermore, these variations may depend on the day of the month or the week. To improve the performance of anomaly detection, it is important to enhance the pro les using exible time schemata in terms of multiple time granularities. We may also use di erent thresholds for building the pro les for di erent time periods.
In order to solve the problems mentioned above, we propose to build temporal pro les that consider multiple time granularities. To achieve this goal, this paper rst de nes the notion of calendar schema to describe time periods (called calendar expressions). The calendar schema can be easily used to describe time periods such as \early morning of the rst business day of each week". The paper then formulates the pro le-building task as discovery of association rules for each possible calendar expression. Di erent algorithms are proposed to solve this problem e ciently. Because multiple time granularities are used for pro le generation, the proposed method is more exible and precise than previous methods that use xed division of time periods. Finally, the paper describes an experiment and its analysis on real TCP-dump data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some basic concepts including association rules, calendar schemata, and temporal pro les. Section 3 proposes algorithms to discover temporal pro les. Section 4 discusses the issue of building temporal pro les, and presents our experimental result on the DARPA intrusion detection evaluation data. Section 5 discusses some related work. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and identi es some directions for future research. contain X Y . The mining task is formulated to nd all rules such that the support of each rule is greater than a given minimum support threshold and the con dence is greater than a given minimum con dence threshold.
The association rule discovery is composed of two steps. The rst step is to discover all the large item-sets (candidate item-sets X Y that have more support than the minimum support threshold speci ed). The second step is to generate association rules from these large item-sets. The computation of nding the large item-sets is much more expensive than nding the rules from these large item-sets. For this reason, we actually aim at nding large item-sets in our method rather than the related association rules. We use the terms \rules" and \large item-sets" interchangably throughout the paper. The reader is referred to 4] for the method of generation of association rules from large item-sets.
A number of algorithms have been developed for discovering large item-sets 5, 6, 7, 8] . The Apriori algorithm 5] is the state of the art in this area that has smaller computa-1 A transaction is a set of items.
tional complexity compared to other algorithms. The high level structure of Ariori is given in Figure 1 . The algorithm Apriori consists of a number of passes. During pass k, the algorithm rst generates C k , the candidate item-sets of size k, and nds the set of large item-sets L k (a subset of C k ) by scanning all transactions in the dataset. Function apriori gen constructs C k by extending from the large item-sets of size k ? 1, which ensures that all the subsets of size k ? 1 of a new candidate item-set are in L k?1 . The algorithm also uses a hash tree 5] to store all candidate item-sets C k and their counts. Function subset traverses the hash tree and computes the counts of the candidate item-sets e ciently. The reader may refer to 5] for further details.
Calendar Schema
In reality, a lot of datasets (e.g. audit trail data) are stored together with timestamps. The timestamps are usually represented in terms of multiple granularities (e.g., 1/15/99-14:41:44 is in terms of time granularities month, day, year, hour, minute, second). In order to describe time periods in terms of multiple time granularities, we de ne the following notion of calendar schema.
A calendar schema is a relation schema (in a relational database model) which has elds f i and corresponding domains D i (1 i n): ( For simplicity, we require that every granule of f i in the calendar schema be covered by a granule of f i+1 , thereby disallowing some ambigious calendar schemata such as (year; month; week) because not every week is completely covered by a month. It is often convenient and necessary for users to de ne their own granularities used in calendar schemata. For example, the 24 hours of a day can be partitioned into ve parts, representing early morning, morning, work hour, night, and late night respectively, each part becoming a granule in the new granularity.
We shall use calendar expressions as part of pro les for anomaly detection. Before doing that, we introduce some notation for calendar expressions. First, the calendar expressions with k wild cards are called the k-star expressions, and the set of k-star expressions is denoted E k . In addition, the calendar expressions with no wild card (i.e. 0-star expressions) are called basic time units. According to the de nition of calendar expression, we know that if we replace any k (1 k n) integer(s) in e 0 with the wild card, we get a k-star expression (totally C k n such expressions). Obviously, the time period of e 0 is covered by those of any such k-star epression. We denote the set of such k-star expressions as E k (e 0 ). Note E k (e 0 ) E k .
Temporal Pro les
A pro le is de ned as a set of association rules discovered from a dataset (for intrusion detection) in which there are no attacks. Furthermore, a pro le discovered from the subset of transactions (or tuples, records in the dataset) whose timestamps are covered by a calendar expression e, is called a temporal pro le for e.
The purpose of using a pro le is to predict future events. For example, if a pro le is obtained from a ten weeks dataset, we actually assume that the \normal" behavior described by this pro le will repeat in the future, ten weeks by ten weeks. If we use temporal pro le, the semantics is richer due to the calendar expression. For the same ten weeks dataset, if we use the calendar schema (week; day), then the temporal pro le for the calendar expression h ; 1i can be used to predict future events that happen on \every Monday". Note the temporal pro le for a basic time unit e.g. h1; 1i only describes the \normal" behavior on a speci c day (i.e. Monday of the very rst week in the whole span of time considered in the application), which may be too speci c to be used in prediction of future events.
Given a calendar schema, we formulate the discovery of temporal pro les as nding association rules for each possible calendar expression except the basic time units. We are not interested in the temporal pro les that only hold for basic time units since they are too speci c to be used in prediction. In addition, these pro les can be easily found by \traditional" association rule discovery methods that do not consider the time factor.
In the above de nition, there are two ways to explain \an association rule holding for a calendar expression e". One is that the association rule holds for each basic time unit that is covered by e, we call this precise match de nition of temporal pro le. Another is that the association rule holds for each of a set of basic time units, and that the number of these basic time units is greater than a fraction of the total number of basic time units that are covered by e. We call this fuzzy match de nition. The fraction ratio is called match ratio.
For example, given a calendar schema (month; morning), e = h1; i, and there are 30 mornings in the rst month. An item-set I will be in the temporal pro le for e if: we specify that the item I should receive su cient support in each morning of the rst month. The above de nitions permit us to decide which types of item-sets are going to be the baseline of normal pro les. We further explain that an association rule holds for a basic time unit e 0 if it is an association rule in the dataset consisting of transactions whose timestamps are e 0 . Here we assume that the timestamps are already in the form of basic time units. If they are in other forms, we need to convert them rst. For example, a timestamp \3am on Monday of the rst week" can be converted to \early morning on Monday of the rst week" if we stipulate that the granularity \early morning" be \0am to 6am of every day". Some research on calendar algebra proposed in 10, 11, 12] can be used to realize such conversions. Due to space limitation, we do not address this issue.
Algorithms
For a given calendar schema (f n ; f n?1 ; : : : ; f 1 ), we develop an algorithm to discover temporal pro les (association rules) for the two types of de nitions (i.e., precise match and fuzzy match). Both algorithms can be divided into two steps. In the rst step, the algorithm Apriori (see section 2.1) is used to nd the association rules (large item-sets) for each basic time unit. The second step uses some tree structrues, called calendar hash trees, to compute association rules for each calendar expression except the basic time units. The two steps are not executed in sequence but in an interleaved manner to optimize the process.
Algorithm for Precise Match De nition (PMA)
The high level structure of the algorithm for discovering association rules of the precise match de nition, denoted PMA, is given in Figure 2 .
Compared with the algorithm Apriori in Figure 1 , PMA adds lines 2.1.4 and 2.2 and modi es some other lines. PMA consists of the same number of passes as the Apriori algorithm. Initially, L 1 (e 0 ) contains all the items (i.e., item set of size one) that satisfy the minimum support requirement. This is done by scanning the entire dataset one time (pass 1). During pass k, the algorithm nds the set of large item-sets (L k (e 0 )) of size k for each basic time unit e 0 . The algorithm terminates when L k (e 0 ) is empty for all e 0 in E 0 . During each pass, the algorithm rst uses the Apriori algorithm (lines 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) to compute large item-set L k (e 0 ) for each basic time unit. After getting all L k (e 0 ), the algorithm uses a series of calendar hash trees, denoted as calTree i (1 i n), to compute the large item-set L k (e i ) for each i-star expression (line 2.2). This is realized 
Calendar Hash Trees
The calendar hash tree calTree i in PMA is used to store the i-star expressions and their corresponding large item-sets. The procedure to store and search an i-star expression e i in calTree i can be described as follows: (1) Starting from the root note, it follows a one-to-one mapping from di erent distribution of wild cards in e i to a child node of the root. ...... The function to calTree i (e 0 ; L k (e 0 )) (lines 2.1.4.1 in Figure 2 ) is used to update L k (e i ) for some i-star expressions. First, we get E i (e 0 ), i.e. the set of i-star expressions that cover e 0 . Then for each e i 2 E i (e 0 ), the leaf node where L k (e i ) is stored is located by use of the \store and search procedure". Finally we set L k (e i ) = L k (e i )\L k (e 0 ). The correctness of using this formula is explained further in the next subsection.
The function from calTree i (line 2.2.1 in Figure 2 ) is used to collect all large itemsets for each i-star expression that are stored in the calendar hash tree. This function also uses the same \store and search procedure" to locate the information required.
Correctness of PMA
According to the problem we formulated in section 2.3, we are looking for the large item-sets L k (e i ) for each calendar expression e i (1 i n), and each item-set in L k (e i ) should be large for any basic time unit e 0 that is covered by e i . One natural way is to compute those large item-sets L k (e 0 ) for each basic time unit e 0 that is covered by e i , then compute L k (e i ) = T e 0 L k (e 0 ) as the result. This is simple, but, it requires a lot of memory to store L k (e 0 ) for all basic time units before computing L k (e i ).
In PMA, we store L k (e i ) for all i-star expressions in calTree i by the function to calTree i rather than store L k (e 0 ) for all basic time units. This is because each L k (e i ) is actually an intersection of many L k (e 0 ), and the size of L k (e i ) is much smaller than those L k (e 0 ) in general case.
In PMA, L k (e 0 ) is computed one by one for each e 0 (line 2.1 in Figure 2 ). Only the current result of L k (e 0 ) is used by function to calTree i (line 2.1.4 in Figure 2 ). After the loop for e 0 is done, from the standpoint of e i , every L k (e 0 ) has been put to the calendar hash tree, and L k (e i ) has been updated. Therefore, L k (e i ) equals T e 0 L k (e 0 ) for those e 0 covered by e i .
Algorithm for Fuzzy Match De nition (FMA)
The algorithm for discovering association rules of the fuzzy match de nition, denoted FMA, is a little bit di erent from PMA. We can still use the same high level structure as that in Figure 2 , however, the function to calTree i (e 0 ; L k (e 0 )) (lines 2.1.4.1 in Figure 2 ) need to be modi ed. After locating the position in a leaf node where L k (e i ) is stored for each e i that covers e 0 , we do not use the formular L k (e i ) = L k (e i ) \ L k (e 0 ). Instead, the function to calTree i maintains a count variable for each item-set in L k (e i ), and increases the count by 1 for those item-sets in L k (e i ) \ L k (e 0 ).
After the loop for e 0 (line 2.1' in Figure 2) is done, the count of a item-set is just the number of basic time units for which the item-set is large. Given a match ratio r (see section 2.3), and N i that is the total number of basic time units covered by e i , we prune those item-sets (stored in calendar trees) if their counts are less than r N i . We use a function: fuzzy prune() to realize this pruning, and insert it in Figure 2 just before line 2.2.
Note PMA can be viewed as a special case of FMA by setting the match ratio be 1 (100%).
Performance Study
We study the performance of the two algorithms using the training data of DARPA's intrusion detection evaluation data ( 15] and see the subsequent section 4.2.1). The timestamps of the training data span 7 weeks and the total size of the training data is around 270 Megabytes. For this implementation, we use the following calendar schemata: C 1 = (week; group day; group hour), C 2 = (week; day; group hour) where the time granularity group day has two values: 1 represents business days in a week, and 2 represents holidays and weekend in a week. The time granularity group hour has ve values: 1 for early morning (from 0am to 6am), 2 for morning (from 6am to 8am), 3 for work hour (from 8am to 6pm), 4 for night (from 6pm to 8pm), and 5 for late night (from 8pm to 12pm). We can easily convert the timestamps in the training data to the basic time units for the calendar schemata de ned above. Figure 4 plots the execution time at various levels of support (from 0:25% to 2%) using calendar schemata C 1 and C 2 for algorithm PMA, and algorithm FMA with different match ratios r = 4=7, r = 1=7 and r = 1=35 respectively. All algorithms are implemented and tested on a SUN/SPARC-2 workstation with 512 megabytes of main memory. In Figure 4 , the algorithms show good scale up as the support threshold descreases. Because more calendar expressions need to be checked using the calendar schema C 2 than using C 1 (113 vs. 61), the execution time of algorithms using C 2 is longer than using C 1 . In either case, compared with algorithm PMA, algorithm FMA is not a ected much by the match ratios because counting the support of candidate itemsets dominates the overall running time of the algorithms. While the presence of match ratio does undermine the performance of FMA, it is not serious enough to signi cantly a ect the running time. Section 3 presents algorithms for discovering the temporal pro les (association rules) for each calendar expression. In order to be used in di erent intrusion detection environment, these temporal pro les need to be integrated into an overall temporal pro le (also called temporal pro le if no confusion arises). During this process, users may consider the following factors.
Types of calendar schemata The stronger temporal patterns of normal behaviors can be described by using the ner division of calendar unit time. For example, the calendar unit time for the calendar schema C 2 is ner than that for C 1 , thus the \normal" item-sets that are large in the work hour of every Monday can be described by C 2 . However, such \normal" item-sets can not be described by C 1 since C 1 lacks the concept of Monday.
Types of temporal pro les The normal behavior is best described using precise match de nition versus using fuzzy match de nition. However, if a system lacks such \strict" normal behavior, the fuzzy match de nition provides much exibility.
Di erent match ratios The greater the fuzzy match ratio, the stronger the relationship between the normal behavior and the time division.
Di erent support thresholds Di erent support thresholds can be used for building temporal pro les for di erent time periods. A rising threshold correlates to a decreasing number of rules in the pro le. As a result, a rule mined in the detection phase has greater possibility to be suspicious.
We merge all temporal pro les with their corresponding time periods (calendar expressions) into an overall temporal pro le. In this overall pro le, we may further group the association rules by the source hosts (source IPs). In this way the temporal pro le is host-based. We note that the temporal pro le should be built based on the characteristics of normal behavior of a system. The normal behaviors of some systems may have strong time patterns, while some other systems may not. We present our preliminary result on DARPA's intrusion detection evalulation data in the next section.
Experiment on DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data 4.2.1 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data
The DARPA data is collected and distributed by the Information Systems Technology Group of MIT Lincoln Laboratory under Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA ITO) and Air Force Research Laboratory sponsorship. The 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data 13] consists of two types of data: training data and test data. The training data consists of 7 weeks of network-based attacks in the midst of mormal background data. Attacks are labeled in training data. The test data consists of 2 weeks network-based attacks. Both TCP-dump and BSM data are provided for each day. We apply our algorithms on the TCP-dump training data (270MB) to build di erent types of pro les, and then use the TCP-dump test data (133MB) to detect attacks using di erent pro les.
The packet data in the TCP-dump dataset can be preprocessed to result in a table with the following schema: R(T s ; Src:IP; Src:Port; Dst:IP; Dst:Port)
We mine association rules in the relation instance of R. Notice in the context of intrusion detection, the association rules we are intrested are more restrictive than those in the general market-basket data case. For instance, there can be no rules with two di erent Src:IP values in the antecedent (i.e. no connection comes from two sources). Nevertheless, the number of pontential rules is large: connections may come from a large base of source IP addresses and ports. We use the association rule discovery method as in basket analysis but restrict the result rules to the following meaningful forms: 
Experimental Results
In order to nd the \normal" behaviors in the DARPA data, we apply the o ine algorithms depicted in section 3 to the training dataset. The result item-sets are the temporal pro les of normal usage patterns. For this implementation, we use the calendar schema C 2 that is mentioned in section 3.3: (week; day; group hour)
We rst use the precise match de nition and fuzzy match de nition with match ratio 1/7 to build the temporal pro les. No rule was found in either case. Thus we know that the \normal" rules in the DARPA data do not have strong relationship with the time periods. Therefore we use the fuzzy match de nition with match ratio 1/35 in our experiment.
After building the temporal pro le, we mine the association rules from DARPA's two weeks test data in order to detect intrusions. Each time we use 1 day's test data and get the rules for each time periods (from early moring to late night). We compare each rule to the temporal pro le 4 . If the rule does not appear in the pro le, then it is viewed as suspicious rule 5 . If it appears, we further check if the time period in which the rule is discovered is covered by one of the calendar expressions of the matched rule in the pro le. If yes, the rule is ignored, otherwise it is aged as suspicious.
Note that the time factor has already been considered in some papers for constructing intrusion detection models by using association rule discovery 1,2,3]. For example, three pro les for time periods: morning, afternoon and night are used in 3] for describing each user's behavior. However, the division of time periods mentioned in these papers is xed. Compared with our temporal pro le, this xed time division lacks exibility and ability to describe some normal behaviors. For example, suppose a secretory works full-time (morning and afternoon) on Monday, and part-time (morning) on the other weekdays. The secretary's rule can be easily described by temporal pro les with calendar expressions hweek : ; weekday : 1; workhour : i and hweek : ; weekday : ; workhour : afternooni, while it is impossible to describe such rule using xed time division such as morning and afternoon.
To compare our temporal pro le with previous work (using xed time division), we also build a pro le for each of the ve time periods corresponding to the ve group hours in our calendar schema (i.e. early morning, morning, work hour, night, and late night). The union of these pro les is equivalent to our temporal pro le if we only consider 5 calendar expressions h ; ; 1i, h ; ; 2i, . . . ,h ; ; 5i as valid. Thus we can apply the algorithms proposed in this paper to get the union of these pro les. We name it the \previous pro le" in our experiment.
The experimental result is listed in Table 1 , where the absolute support threshold for mining rules in test data is 30, and the absolute theshold for building the temporal pro le and the previous pro le 1 is also 30. Di erent absolute thresholds are used for building the previous pro le 2: 10 for the early morning, 10 for the morning, 30 for the work hour, 20 for the night, and 10 for the late night. Table 1 : Intrusion detection result for di erent pro les.
From Table 1 , we see the temporal pro le works best, with the fewest average suspicious rules per day while having the same detected attacks. Even if the previous pro le can be improved by using di erent threshold for di erent time period, it still performs worse than the temporal pro le using single threshold.
To illustrate the advantage of our temporal pro le over the previous pro les, we pick up three rules in both previous pro les and the temporal pro le. Table 2 lists the corresponding time periods or calendar expressions of these rules in di erent pro les. From Table 2 we see that more precise information about time is provided by the temporal pro le. The set of time periods associated with a rule in the previous pro le is actually a subset of the counterpart in the temporal pro le. For example, the connection from source IP 172.016.112.020 to destination port 123 will be viewed as suspicious during night (h ; ; 3i) on every Monday if we use the previous pro les. However, this connection will be normal if we use the temporal pro le since the connection is in the pro le with the calendar expression h ; 1; i (every group hour of every Monday). This is the reason that the number of suspicious rules using temporal pro le is less than that using previous pro les.
The result in Table 1 is not so encouraging; however, most of missed attacks are smurf attacks which can be only detected by multiple level association rule discovery 14], and they are beyond our single level association rule method. On the other hand, the suspicious rules can be further examined by using other methods such as decision tree and meta-learning techniques 3], and the number of them will be reduced. Due to space limit, we do not address these issues in this paper.
In the experiment, we nd that DARPA 98 training data does not have strong temporal patterns, because we believe that the DARPA data is basically arti cial. The results using temporal pro le should be much better if the behaviors of most hosts in a network have strong temporal patterns. In the real world situation, we expect the Table 2 : Rules in di erent pro les.
subnetworks of most companies, institutes and organizations have such characteristics. We will implement our method to some real datasets in the future.
Related Work
The pro le based technique for intrusion detection is rst introduced by D. Denning in 15] . The model used by Denning is a rule-based pattern matching system, independent of the target system for which it is detecting intrusions. Our technique uses the same principle, although we focus on the discovery of abnormal association rules instead of arbitrary patterns. Lee et al. 1, 2, 3] , in the context of the JAM project, describe the use of association rules mining to discover the behaviors of intrusions. The main di erence with our work is that we build temporal pro les using exible calendar schema in terms of multiple time granularities, rather than xed division of time periods.
Without addressing the implementation issues in intrusion detection system, some papers already discussed the association rule discovery that considers the time factor. The concept of temporal association rules was rst mentioned by Chen et al. 16] and Rainford et al. 17] . In addition to conceptual discussion, Ramaswamy et al. 11 ] studied the discovery of intresting patterns in association rules. In their paper, the concept of \calendric" association rules is similar to the precise match and fuzzy match de nitions in this paper, except that \absolute" match ratio, called \mis-matches", is adopted there. In that paper, it is up to users to de ne some \interested calendars" which are sets of integer intervals in terms of some basic time units (e.g., weeks in January 1996 is denoted as f(-3,4), (5, 11) , (12, 18) , (19,25), (26, 32)g in terms of days). The data mining task is formulated to nd association rules for each user-de ned \calendar".
There are two main di erences in our paper. First, we do not use a set of integer intervals to express time periods, instead, we use calendar expression in terms of multiple time granularities. In reality, most timestamps stored in dataset are in terms of multiple time granularities, and human users can understand the calendar expression very well. Second, some pruning method proposed in 11] may not be valid in the context of this paper. Informally, the pruning technique porposed in 11] is based on the user given \calendars" that are not closely related (the time domains do not intersect with each either). For example, if a user want to discover association rules for the \calendar": \Monday of every week", the pruning method for the precise-match-like de nition says that if a item-set A is not large for the Monday of the rst week, then it is not necessary to check if A is large for the Mondays of the other weeks. This method can also be used to check a group of \calendars" such as \Monday of every week", \Tuesday of every week" etc.. However, this pruning method is not valid for discovering all association rules for each possible calendar expression. For example, even if A is not large for the Monday of the rst week, we still need to check A for the Monday of the second week, because A could be large for the calendar expression h2; i or \every day in the second week". The discussion on fuzzy-match-like de nition is similar.
In another paper 18], Ramaswamy et al. also discussed nding cyclic association rules where the \calendars" are periodic time intervals in term of single time granularity. Although they discussed the discovery of all cycles within a xed length for the precisematch-like de nition, it shares the same di erences as we mentioned above.
Conclusion
The main contributions of this paper can be concluded as follows. First, a concept of calendar schema is de ned to describe time periods (calendar expressions) in terms of multiple time granularities. Second, two types of temporal pro les are de ned, and the algorithms for discovering the temporal pro les are developed. Third, the exibility and preciseness of temporal pro les are discussed.
Although a exible mechanism for building temporal pro les is presented in this paper, we do not address the problem of temporal pro les optimization in detail. It is possible to develop a self-learning algorithm to guide the process of temporal pro le generation in various intrusion detection environment. We leave this topic to the future work.
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